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Abstract
This paper discusses vulnerabilities of mobile agent based information systems and calls for an increased level
of security awareness, which can be achieved by employing self-reliant security features. The paper describes
an IS realised as a multi-agent architecture. For a secure channel to exist within the IS, the use of indicator
digests reduces the risk of exposing sensitive information to malicious objects. These solutions add to the
underlying layer of security offered by the execution environment and work as plug-ins. This enables them to
seamlessly integrate with the system they are protecting and to be transparent to the application user.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the years different definitions for Information Systems (IS) have been proposed which have attempted to
capture the functioning and the goal behind the development of these systems. Alter (1999) has defined an IS as
a work system, whose business processes are directed towards capturing, transporting, holding, retrieving,
manipulating and presenting the information within the system. While this presents a simplistic definition of a
complex system, (Whitten et al 2001) extends this thought to describe an IS as an arrangement of people, data,
processes, communications and information technology which provide the necessary support for day to day
operations of a business including support for problem solving and decision making. This definition brings to
light the various entities of an Information system and relates their common functions to each other.
Implementation of an IS has been done using different paradigms. In this paper, we model an IS using a multiagent system (MAS).
Increased volume of information, the need for disconnected computing, requirements of faster access,
improvements in wireless technologies and a reduction in computing costs has set the stage for the advent of
Mobile Agents (MA). These agents have been defined as computerized servants, which communicate, cooperate
and negotiate with other agents. A MAS is a network of MAs, which travels and operates as a cohesive unit.
While each of these MAs may have their individual tasks cut out, they work and coordinate their functions
towards a central goal of the community. According to Franklin et al (1996), a MA extends a user’s authority
into the computing world. It executes on the user’s behalf and attempts to accomplish pre-defined objective(s).
An important aspect that distinguishes it from other forms of mobile code is that it possesses intelligence. On
being presented with a number of options, it analyses and chooses the best course of action, without contacting
its parent server. Autonomy is another aspect which makes it an ideal information gathering and retrieval tool
and a suitable candidate for developing an IS.
Developing an IS using a MAS, allows it access to a continuous stream of rapidly changing information from a
variety of sources which makes it a powerful tool for the organisation employing it. On the other hand, this
feature makes it vulnerable to a number of security threats from different external as well as internal entities.
This paper examines security threats and proposes solutions for a safer mode of computing with respect to the
communication and authentication function of MAs in a non-trusted environment. For communication, it
proposes the use of indicator digests, while the use of intelligent context sensitive identifiers are highlighted for
the authentication function of MAs. The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section “Implementing an IS
using a MA” describes the realisation of an IS using a MAS. The sections “Communication Function” and
“Authentication Function” analyse the security goals in an IS and explain the proposed solutions. The final
section concludes the paper with an indication of ongoing work.
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IMPLEMENTING AN IS USING A MAS
The concept of using MAs in developing Information Systems is an evolving new paradigm, which is fast
catching momentum and gaining the approval of the data centric community. The advantage of this approach
has led to the integration of mobility with information. In the m-commerce world the use of MA, has led to the
development of a variety of applications, which range from offering matchmaking services to finding the best
quote for an airlines ticket. The use of MAs for developing information based services which work on the basis
of context has been examined. As a consequence, some commercial applications are available in the market. The
development of Cyberguide by Abowd et al (1997), which uses location as a context to guide tourists around the
city is one such initiative.
For setting up an IS using agents, different groups are given specific functionality. In one scenario, information
searching is handled by a specific group of agents. These agents are mobile and are programmed to wander
around the web searching for specific chunks or pieces of information. This information can be stock quotes for
a particular share, as in different stock exchanges around the world or it can be news releases on sale by
different news agencies around the world. These information-searching agents roam the web, from node to node
searching for information, matching its search criteria. On finding such information it either carries a part of that
information or the location of the information back to its parent. This data about a successful information search
is then passed on to Retriever agents. The job of these agents is to bring back the information from the given
location. Once this information has been retrieved and is available at the parent node, data mining agents take
over. These agents mine the data searching for particular references and chunks of data. Information is then
organised and made available in the format desired by the user. Thus, the use of a MAS can effectively set up
and manage an IS for an organisation. The benefits of such a model are dynamic data updation, faster
information retrieval and the advantage of employing the flexibility and the usability of agents. However, on the
other hand, an open and dynamic system such as the one proposed above has its weaknesses. It can be
susceptible to security threats and attacks. To understand this, we need to examine the smallest unit of our IS,
the structure and the characteristics of a MA.
Essentially every MA possesses state, behaviour and location. State refers to the data state and the execution
state of the entity. (Cabri et al 2000). Behaviour refers to the intent of the agent or rather the functions of the
agent, which enable it to meet its objectives. Location implies a unique position relative to a fixed point of
reference, which facilitates locating the agent. At a higher-level three components of a MA space can be
identified. These are Data, The Mobile Agent (MA) and The Mobile Agent System (MAS). Attacks to the agent
space can be directed at any of these three components, either directly or indirectly. Direct attacks as the name
suggest target the entity directly. For example, an agent server may attack an agent, to capture the data carried
by it. This is can be termed as a direct attack on the agent code and an indirect attack on the data carried by it.
These attacks can work in different modes, for example an open mode and a concealed mode. Attacking in an
open mode implies that the attacker is not concerned with concealment. Symptoms of an open attack can range
from degradation of service to corruption of system files. Concealed attacks are difficult to detect because they
do not disturb the equilibrium of the agent space. Examples of such attacks are eavesdropping, tracking agent
travel etc. Figure 1 explains the different modes and kinds of attacks that can be launched on a mobile agent
space.
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Figure.1. Attacks on an Agent Environment
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Security in a MAS is implemented at various levels using different schemes. These schemes constantly monitor
incoming and outgoing network traffic. Hence, attacks directed at a MAS usually are concealed and strong. On
the other hand, MAs are lightweight processes. Their functionality is specific and they cannot carry elaborate
security measures, while in transit. Attacks at MAs, attempt to intercept and subvert. By subverting the MA,
attackers can indirectly attack the parent system when the agent returns to it. This paper provides an analysis of
the possible vulnerabilities of MAS and some approaches of reducing these vulnerabilities.

COMMUNICATION FUNCTION
Agents communicate and work in a heterogenous and dynamic environment. They are expected to be
interoperable and flexible in what they say and in what they can understand. This communication may be
between agents of the same group or with agents of different communities. Agent systems use an Agent
Communication Language (ACL) to communicate. Although, a lot of effort has gone into the development of
ACLs, there still remain a number of issues, which prohibit any one language from becoming the de-facto
standard. Singh (1998) proposed a movement in individual representations of ACLs to a more generic approach
based on social interaction. The need for this paradigm shift was identified from the fact that agents were not
being able to communicate as heterogeneous entities.
The design goals of ACLs, classify them as protocols rather than programming languages because of their
relation with “intelligent data”. Intelligent data implies information flavoured with the purpose of intent. Take
for example: A transaction which states credit a savings account. This can be regarded as data. There is not
much information carried with it, save for the fact that a particular account is to be credited. The same
transaction if stated as, Credit $50 in Account No 12122 and Debit $50 in Account No 3232 and tag as ‘Book
Sales’ carries more information. It tells us
1. The particular account number to be credited.
2. The particular account number to be debited.
3. The amount involved in transactions 1 & 2.
4. The reason for the transactions i.e. Book Sales.
The ARPA knowledge sharing effort of Patil et al (1992), led to the development of the Knowledge Query and
Manipulation Language (KQML) (Labrou 1997) and Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF) (Genesereth et al
1991). Apart from these two ACLs, the Foundation of Independent Physical Agents (FIPA 1998) has come up
with its own specification of an ACL These ACLs have certain limitations as pointed out by Dignum et al
(2000) and (Mayfield 1995), which restrict their functionality and make them vulnerable to eavesdroppers.
The use of predicate calculus with declarative semantics in KIF (Genesereth et al 1991) allows agents to parse
and understand the actual content of messages they may receive. This also allows the agent to compose arbitrary
sentences and to understand the meanings of expressions without using an interpreter. While this increases the
flexibility of KIF as an ACL, it still does not make a case for a secure framework of communication.
KQML (Labrou 1997) attempted at setting up a formal semantic layer for the efficient exchange of information
between agents (Mayfield 1995). The goal of KQML was to provide a standard message format and a robust
protocol to handle these messages. While a secure architecture of KQML (Thirunavukkarasu et el 1995)
addressing privacy, authentication and non-repudiation (with some considerations) has been proposed, there are
limitations. Only agents supporting cryptographic capabilities can send out secured messages. While this is a
reasonable assumption, we need to consider that incorporating cryptography into the agent function will only
increase the complexity of the agent design. Thus, this approach is to be avoided.
A possible solution to this problem could be the complete removal of transmitting sensitive information in the
agent communication function. The agent will carry only an indication of the actual message. This indication is
referred to as an ‘Indicator Digest’. The indicator digest will be intelligent enough to convey the context and
location of the actual message. On receiving the indicator digest, the receiver is alerted to a possible
communication session. An analysis of the indicator digest will give the recipient an indication of three things.
1. The sender of the message
2. The context of the message
3. The location of the message
Figure 2 describes this concept. In case 1, the agent is burdened with carrying the entire message. Apart from the
additional effort required on the agent’s part to transport the entire message correctly, there is also a risk of the
agent getting captured and the information being lost. In case 2, a context based compression function is applied
to generate an indicator digest. The agent now, carries this indicator digest to the destination server. The idea
behind the use of an indicator digest is to reduce the workload of an agent and to make it difficult for an attacker
to intercept sensitive information.
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Case 1

Case 2
Message
Sell xyz
Amt 124
Buy 324
Qty 123
Ref 678
Chk 345

Context Based
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Secure Communication Channel is set up for
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(Srv 12)

Destination
Machine

Figure.2. Using an indicator digest for agent communication
The structure of an indicator digest is detailed in figure 3. The indicator digest has to be strong enough to meet
the challenges of non-repudiation and forgery. This is only possible if the information carried in the indicator
digest is unique and can be reverified easily. Now, what can be considered as unique information? To
understand this, consider the case of an aircraft taking off from Frankfurt airport at 1012 hrs. The ATC logs will
clearly record the flight no, the time of the flight and the destination of the flight (probably, the flight plan). A
number of aircraft may have taken off from the airport during the day, but the entry pertaining to this particular
flight will be unique. Similarly, for a server, which sends out messages, there should be server logs, that record
details of every message going out. Another good analogy of this concept is the storing of sent messages in the
sent items folder in an email client. Each message stored in the sent items folder is a copy of the one sent out and
this premise holds good if the software is functioning correctly.
Indicator Id (Maps to a Particular Message)
Sender Id (Sender machine IP)
Location of the Actual Message (Server IP)
Context of the Message (using Key-Words)
Expiry date/time of the Message
Figure.3. Structure of an indicator digest
Consider a scenario in which Bob wants to message Alice. Bob generates his message and stores it in a
particular location within a secure server; we refer to this server as the Post Office. Using the context-based
compression function, he then generates an indicator digest, a sample of which is shown in figure 4.
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In402xxx
Bob.160.110.12.23
Sec 110.122.12.12
Finan Trd
Figure.4. Example of an indicator digest
On receiving the indicator digest, Alice is alerted to the fact that Bob’s server 160.110.12.23 has posted a
message for her at the server address 110.122.12.12. The message relates to a financial trade (Finan Trd) and
will expire on the 5/02/2003 at 6:39:26. To re-confirm whether Bob has really posted a message or there is
someone impersonating Bob, Alice can view the message logs of Bob’s server at 160.110.12.23. These logs are
available in a read mode to entities, which have been sent messages from Bob’s server. Thus, Alice is now sure
in the knowledge that Bob has posted a message for her at a certain location. All she has to do is set up an
encrypted channel to the Post Office using a security protocol such as SSL (SSL2.0 1995) and retrieve the
message. The messaging algorithm for the communication will be as follows.
/*Message Generation and Parsing */
/*Pre-processing Steps*/
1. Generate the general structure of the message using a pre-proc
2. Add the key words of the message
3. Parse the message through the parser
/* Check for completeness of the message */
4. Compile the message to check for errors
5. Is the message complete in all respects?
6.
If yes then GOTO step (8) else
7. Debug the errors and return to step (3)
8. Record message parameters like size, time of generation, addressee /*This will be useful in audit trails*/
/* Preparation of the message indicators */
9. Pass the complete message through the Indicator-generation program
10. Check the indicator-digest
11. Is the indicator-digest complete in all respects?
12. If yes then GOTO step (14) else
13. Debug and return to step (9)
14. Give the indicator digest a unique identifier
15. Record the indicator digest identifier against the actual message
This approach to messaging has several advantages. Firstly, sensitive data need not be carried over an open
network. Secondly, there is significant saving in network bandwidth. Several messages can now be stored in a
server and one indicator digest can refer to all of them. Thirdly, the probability of agents getting attacked is now
reduced, as the attacker is aware that the agent has nothing of value on it. On intercepting an indicator digest, the
attacker may be alerted to the fact that Bob and Alice are brokering a deal, but to find out more he has to
approach the secure server where the message is lodged. Thus, his attack will now have to be against a strong,
secure server which has been specifically been prepared to meet such attacks rather than against a weak
unsuspecting agent.

AUTHENTICATION FUNCTION
The Authentication function is the first line of defence for a MAS. The size of this layer depends mainly upon
the functional objectives of the MAS. For example, if the MAS is working on behalf of a bank or a stock
broking firm, the authentication layer will be thick with many sub-layers of security involved. On the other
hand, if the MAS is engaged in conducting a survey of some kind and has agents from other systems
approaching it regularly, it may decide to have a thin layer of authentication.
Having a thick authentication layer for a MAS, which has a high volume of traffic to it, can lead to a general
performance degradation of the system. The size of the authentication layer is actually a question of tradeoffs.
Having less authentication checks means the turnaround time is less but on the flip side it can become a security
hazard too. Thus, the decision on how many authentication layers to have actually hinges on two points:
1.

What will be the volume of traffic to the node?
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2.

How vital is the information to be protected?

The answer to the first question can be approximated pretty fairly but the second question needs careful
consideration before an answer is volunteered. Most organisations regard data as their life and blood and very
rightly so. Thus, if organisations are not willing to compromise on security for their data but still wish a thin
layer there is only one solution. Allow the authentication to happen in customisable layers, which can be added
or removed from time to time, depending upon the volume of traffic and the importance of the transaction. In the
earlier example of Bob and Alice communicating, consider a scenario in which Bob’s agent approaches the
server of Alice. Alice is expecting Bob’s agent but wants to make sure the agent approaching has actually been
sent by Bob. Alice can turn on all layers of authentication, available to her system and validate the identity of
the approaching agent. On the other hand, if Alice is not concerned about the identity of the agent sender and the
approaching agents are only coming to pick-up information, which is being distributed publicly by Alice, she
might switch off some of the authentication layers.
Currently, the authentication process is implemented in a number of ways. A state appraisal approach given by
Farmer et al (1996) for authentication is one possible approach. This architecture is based on four different trust
relationships, which may exist between principals. A principal is an entity that makes a request to perform
operations on objects. Objects can be files, devices and processes. This theory is proved using the distributed
authentication theory of Lampson et al (1992). The state appraisal authentication model of Farmer et al (1996)
can also be extended to Agent Handoffs and Agent Delegation as a way of transferring or handing over
authority to other agents. To make such transfers seem favourable, the authors have proposed the theory of lists
and certificates. This theory is built around The Sender Permission List (SPL), The Sender Permission
Certificates (SPC), Place Permission Lists and Place Permission Certificates.
Collecting information for generating these lists may involve filling in a migration form with the server’s id,
agent id, principal id, target server’s id, flag and validity period. The agent code and its state appraisal function
is created and signed to ensure that there is no tampering with the code. An SPL is also created. This holds the
list of users who are permitted to transmit the agent. This information is mentioned in the SPC, which are similar
to SPLs but travel as a separate entity with the data. These SPCs indicate the program to which the certificate
refers to and its creator.
While the approach outlined by the state appraisal theory may be effective in the preliminary authentication
process it has some vulnerabilities. Firstly, it relies on signing the code of the agent after the state appraisal
function has been written. This may prove to be a limitation as it is possible to sign only static portions of the
code. Agents do not carry private keys and hence cannot sign their code dynamically. Even if they were to carry
some cryptographic routines, there is no guarantee of them getting executed correctly as the agent is reliant on
the platform for executing its code. Since the agent is moving and functioning in a dynamic environment, it is
not possible for the agent to maintain a constant inner environment. Environmental changes may cause the MA
to modify certain aspects of its functionality. These changes may render the state appraisal functions
dysfunctional. Secondly, the use of certificates and policies is a vulnerable aspect of the model as they are
difficult to maintain and expose the system to malicious attacks. Collecting data to generate these lists is always
a sensitive issue. The verification and validation of data, which is going to form these lists, requires several
questions to be answered. How does once convince oneself, that the data being used is correct and not
compromised? It is difficult to do so. Another drawback of a policy-based approach is that data may change.
The process of updating the lists further disturbs the equilibrium of the system and exposes it to further threats.
Authentication using agent passports has been proposed by Chess et al (1995). This has been further extended
by Schelderup & Ølnes (1999) to include error handling procedures, description of intent and possibly
references to authentication certificates and authorising bodies. On one hand, while increasing the amount of
information volunteered during an authentication process increases the chances of the agent gaining the trust of
the server, it also makes it vulnerable to forgeries or hijacked passports. Furthermore, the system is
compromised if a malicious server is able to manufacture similar passports and send out agents. Thus, this
approach, which is dependent largely upon cryptography and code signing, has its limitations as discussed by
Schelderup & Ølnes (1999).
Since MAs will move and approach many different servers. They will attempt to authenticate themselves to
these servers. Thus, the efficiency of an authentication mechanism depends upon two parameters, Information
and the correctness of that Information. The authentication mechanism may need to ask the right questions and
then correctly analyse the answers received. From the viewpoint of the entity-requesting authentication, a
delicate balance in providing the correct amount of information needs to be maintained. Volunteering extra
information could lead to a malicious agent server learning enough to use the information against the agent or
against its parent server. Providing very less information may not convince the agent platform to grant access
rights and the permission to use its resources. An effective authentication mechanism reflects the desired goals
of the agent server. Consider for example, an agent server, which is selling news releases to different news
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agencies via MAs. What are the parameters of an effective authentication mechanism is this case? What
questions should the agent server ask the approaching agent and what information should be provided by the
agent?
Case 1
In case 1 of the scenario, the identity of the agent is not a primary concern, because the focus is on selling the
information and getting our price. It is similar to visiting a supermarket. When a customer purchases bread or
milk, he is asked to show his passports and identify himself.
In this case, to make a successful sale, the agent server needs to tell the agent
1.

The nature of the news release i.e. whether it pertains to sport, health, current affairs, business, or
weather.

2.

The size of the news release in bytes/characters/words/pages.

3.

The charges of the news release in dollars (Us/Aus), pounds, rupees, riyals, dirhams.

To make a successful purchase, the agent needs to tell the server
1.

Whether it is interested in the purchase of the information available.

2.

The medium through it intends to pay for the information i.e. electronic cash, credit card, debit card,
barter etc.

3.

The medium through which it intends to take delivery of the information.

An analysis of the answers provided by the agent can be sufficient to authenticate it and to move to the next step
of the transaction.
Case 2
In case 2 of the scenario, the identity of the agent is of interest because the intention is to build a profile database
of the customers and provide them with special offers, when they become regulars. In this case, the agent server
needs to ask the agent its personal details and store that information in our database. Thus, the agent server
should ask for
1.

The identity of the agent. (This may not necessarily imply the identity of the agent’s owner. For
example, Reuters or PTI may desire to withhold their names. If such a requirement exists, the agent
server will have to be satisfied by a unique identifier provided by the agent and leave it at that.

2.

The nature of the information the agent is interested in

3.

The medium of payment

4.

The medium of delivery of information

The agent will provide the requested details. The agent server will verify these details and a unique customer
identifier number will be assigned to the agent. This will be linked to secondary identifiers, which could be
details of the last five transactions performed by the agent at the server.
Figure 5 explains the authentication mechanism proposed. It brings to light the importance of context and
content sensitive information for authentication. Context information may refer to the nature of the transaction,
while the content part may concern itself with the details of the transaction. Consider for example, our earlier
scenario of Bob and Alice. Bob sells a book to Alice. The context part of the information refers to a sale, while
the content part of the transaction are the details of the sale, i.e. the title of the book, the cost of the book etc. In
this mechanism, the authentication process is controlled by the context based authentication layer, which acts as
a controller. This controller is fed information by a separate database and will attempt to authenticate the
approaching entity based on its context. If the answers received are satisfactory, the entity will be allowed to
pass through. In all other cases the entity will be diverted through additional levels of authentication, as shown
in figure 5. In figure 6, the use of context sensitive information for a news agency, which disseminates
information through approaching MAs is described. In our prototype implemented using the Grasshopper (2001)
v2.2b MAS, agents approaching the agency for information related to TV programs have got a context sensitive
identifier which is recognized by the agency, when the MA docks.
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Agent Resources
Context
Information
Database

Level 2 of Authentication
Level 1 of Authentication

Context Based Authentication Layer

Entities Requesting Information

Figure.5. Authentication using a context rich layer
If the context identifier is valid, the agency directs the MA to the place at which this information is held. Once
the MA docks at the correct place, its details are authenticated and the information it requests made available.
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Figure.6. An implementation of a context sensitive layer for authentication
Building an authentication mechanism, which can be customized to meet changing scenarios can greatly
improve the efficiency and the turnaround of a pervasive system. It also reduces the confusion and the overhead
of verifying details, which may not be of significance to the agent server. For example, if the transaction is
going to be a one-time transaction, the agent server does not need to build a profile of the agent and concern it
with identifying the agent. This will save storage space and also make the system more intelligent.

CONCLUSION AND ONGOING WORK
Among all decisions that an IS implemented in a pervasive environment has to make; those related to security
are the most complex and critical of all. These decisions range from authenticating users to allowing the
modification of information stored within the system. Having an intelligent context sensitive based layer, which
can understand and recognise context based accesses can significantly improve the turnaround time of the IS.
Future work will attempt to make the IS intelligent enough to identify and pick up pieces of data which can be
put together to generate a valid context.
While communication within a mobile IS requires a secure and trusted channel, it is very difficult to guarantee
the existence and trustworthiness of this channel as it may sometimes require the support of non-trusted servers.
In such situations the importance of transmitting only the bare minimum of sensitive information gains
significance. A security system designed to recognise and respond to chunks of information, rather than large
streams of bytes will make it a difficult target for a potential attacker. The goal is to develop an intelligent
information system in which communication detail is minimum but carries maximum information.
The need for a secure and trusted framework to support the essential requirements of authentication and
communication are essential for the IS to operate in a pervasive environment. IS developed using MAS, have
concentrated only on developing the application layer of the system, but have failed to provide it with its own
self-reliant backbone of security. In most systems, this factor is left to the underlying execution framework. For
example, Java (Gosling, 1996) based systems rely on the security provided by the JVM. While this may be
sufficient to protect the host from malicious agent code, it does nothing to protect the agent code from a
malicious server.
Future work will concentrate on further developing and implementing the model of an indicator digest as a plugin for the MAS. This will allow the agent system to retain it original design, while using this messaging
technique. For the authentication function, we will refine the authentication model to allow a layered mode of
authentication for approaching entities. These layers will work as switches, which could be turned off and on,
depending upon the requirements of the application controller. This will allow the system to manage its security
requirements with more intelligence and control.
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